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French Polynesia
The period under review was not par-
ticularly rich in new events. While no 
economic recovery was in sight, local 
politicians, fed by French subsidies, 
continued their games of making and 
unmaking majorities in the Assembly 
of French Polynesia, culminating in 
the eleventh change of government 
since 2004. The only possibly inter-
esting development is that the new 
pro-independence majority now wants 
to internationalize the country’s prob-
lems and get it out of the grip of Paris.
As the review period started, the 
ongoing political instability continued 
to worsen as President Tong Sang’s 
minority government became more 
and more immobilized. Tong Sang had 
been leading a coalition government 
between his own To Tatou Aia (Our 
Country) party and Gaston Flosse’s 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira (People’s Rally) 
since November 2009, but the coali-
tion virtually broke apart in April 
2010. However, there had not been a 
motion of no confidence against Tong 
Sang because Tahoeraa could not 
agree on a common platform with the 
opposition Union Pour La Démocratie 
(upld, Union for Democracy), led 
by Oscar Temaru. Cabinet ministers 
from Tahoeraa refused to resign, 
even though the party leadership 
claimed Tahoeraa to be an opposition 
party. During a budgetary debate on 
2 August, Tahoeraa representatives 
charged Tong Sang with incompetency 
to lead the country and called on him 
to resign (tp, 2 Aug 2010).
Tahoeraa’s confusing attitude of 
attacking the president and demand-
ing his resignation, while at the same 
time allowing its members to keep 
their cabinet portfolios, can only be 
understood by looking at the pecu-
liarities of French Polynesia’s political 
system. As long as Tong Sang did not 
resign, he could only be overthrown 
by a constructive vote of no confi-
dence, which would require an overall 
majority and entail the automatic 
election of a successor. A resignation, 
on the other hand, would provoke a 
new presidential election, which could 
take up to three rounds of voting. In 
this scenario, Flosse, through clever 
tactics, might have had a chance to 
become president once more, since a 
relative majority would be sufficient 
in the third round (see articles 1 and 
5 of the 2007 Organic Law of French 
Polynesia).
While the stalemate continued 
at home, the battleground for Tahi-
tian politics was temporarily shifted 
overseas. During the annual Pacific 
Islands Forum meeting in Port Vila, 
Vanuatu, on 3–6 August, Vice Presi-
dent Edouard Fritch asked that his 
country finally be granted full mem-
bership. After having been granted 
observer status in 2004, French Poly-
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nesia became an associated member 
in 2006, which Fritch considered an 
unjust, second-class status since it 
precluded the country’s representa-
tives from participating in some of 
the Forum’s important political and 
economic discussions. The request for 
full membership was denied by the 
majority of Forum member countries 
because, according to the Forum’s 
statutes, full membership is limited to 
independent or fully self-governing 
countries (such as those in free associ-
ation), while French Polynesia is con-
sidered only a partially autonomous 
territory under French sovereignty. 
Assembly Speaker Oscar Temaru, 
who also attended the Forum meeting, 
underlined that as long as the country 
was not independent, full membership 
was not possible (tp, 4 Aug, 8 Aug 
2010). In this sense, Fritch and the 
other pro-French politicians have been 
acting hypocritically—at home they 
staunchly refuse independence from 
France while at international meetings 
they act as if their country is a sover-
eign state.
At the same time, irresponsible 
behavior had been common in domes-
tic issues as well. In mid-August, the 
employees of the municipal adminis-
tration of Teva I Uta on Tahiti’s south 
shore went on strike because upld 
Mayor Tina Cross had demanded 
that her employees accept a reduction 
in salaries after misspending by the 
previous Tahoeraa municipal adminis-
tration had brought Teva I Uta to the 
brink of bankruptcy (TPM, Sept 2010). 
It was nearly three months before the 
conflict was resolved and municipal 
services resumed on 3 October (TPM, 
Nov 2010).
A few days later, on 5 October, the 
assembly passed a law prohibiting 
outsider companies from establish-
ing mobile telephone services in the 
country. This protected the monopoly 
of the local Postal and Telecommu-
nications Service, which has led to 
French Polynesia’s mobile phone rates 
being among the most expensive in 
the world (TPM, Nov 2010). When the 
French State Council declared the law 
unconstitutional on 7 February 2011, 
Ia Mana Te Nunaa, one of upld’s 
constituent parties, characterized the 
council’s decision as an act of colo-
nialism (tp, 8 Feb 2011).
On 15–17 October, French Minister 
of Overseas Territories Marie-Luce 
Penchard visited the country. One 
of her agenda items was to discuss 
proposed changes to the election mode 
for the next assembly elections, but 
the changes were staunchly rejected by 
the three main local political parties, 
while a few hundred demonstrators 
demanded immediate early elections. 
In an interview before her departure, 
she was quoted as saying that local 
politicians give her a headache (TPM, 
Nov 2010).
Since local politics give headaches 
to others besides Mme Penchard, more 
and more people are pursuing alterna-
tives to the current official political 
system. One alternative is the creation 
of self-proclaimed governments. The 
most colorful and controversial among 
these, named “Hau Pakumotu,” once 
again made headlines when its “king” 
was crowned in front of the assembly 
in July (TPM, Oct 2010). In October, 
its adherents also occupied a property 
in Outumaoro, Punaauia, on Tahiti’s 
west coast, with their uniformed mili-
tia intimidating other claimants to the 
property (tp, 18 Oct). The month of 
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October also saw the birth of another 
royalist political movement, led by 
Gaston Tetuanui, demanding the 
formation of an autonomous entity in 
the Leeward Islands and the creation 
of a “Kingdom of Hawaiki Nui,” thus 
combining the popular themes of royal 
restoration and outer island secession 
into one movement (TPM, Nov 2010).
The latter theme, outer-island 
autonomy from “Tahitian imperial-
ism,” received a new boost with the 
creation of a “Community of Munici-
palities” in the Marquesas Islands, an 
initiative by the six municipalities in 
the archipelago to create a common 
structure in order to facilitate direct 
negotiations with Paris and bypass 
bureaucracy on the country level. On 
17 December, Joseph Kaiha, the mayor 
of Ua Pou, was elected president of the 
community (TPM, Jan 2011).
On 24 October, the new territorial 
hospital in Taaone, in the city of Pirae 
east of Papeete, was inaugurated after 
nine years of construction. By late 
November, all patients were trans-
ferred from the old Mamao hospital 
in Papeete. With an overall floor 
surface of 65,000 square meters, 546 
beds, ten inner courtyards, and a giant 
glass-covered hall twenty-three meters 
high, the complex in Taaone is one 
of the largest hospitals in the Pacific. 
The hospital was one of the prestige 
projects of former President Flosse, 
whose administration had begun 
construction of the project in 2001. 
Since then, however, construction had 
been slowed many times because the 
country government had not been able 
to afford the high costs and the French 
government was at first reluctant to 
step in to cover the difference. Alto-
gether, construction of the hospital 
cost about 40 billion cfp francs 
(approximately us$400 million), an 
enormous sum for the small country. 
After they had already staged a protest 
in front of the presidential palace in 
July 2010 following the inauguration, 
several construction companies set 
up protest billboards at the entrance 
of the hospital because the country 
government had not paid their bills yet 
(TPM, Aug 2010; tp, 25 Oct 2010).
Critics say that the maintenance 
costs for the huge complex will be 
so high that the country government 
will need more subsidies from Paris 
in order to cover them. Furthermore, 
the hospital’s energy supply depends 
entirely on external power sources, as 
no one thought to cover the gigantic 
roof with solar cells or to use the cold 
water of the nearby ocean as coolant 
for the air conditioning system (TPM, 
Nov 2010). More generally speaking, 
it is quite problematic that the current 
health policy of the country govern-
ment focuses almost entirely on Tahiti 
Island, where cutting-edge medical 
technology is made available in a giant 
hospital, while medical care on the 
outer islands often remains precarious.
Another improvement in infra-
structure occurred on 1 September, 
when the underwater cable between 
Tahiti and Hawai‘i, named Hono-
tua, was put into service, enabling 
high-speed Internet access for French 
Polynesia (TPM, Oct 2010). However, 
in mid-March 2011 the cable project 
also led to a judicial investigation of 
various politicians and administra-
tors, including President Tong Sang, 
because there were irregularities in the 
awarding of the contract to telecom-
munications company Alcatel (TPM, 
April 2011).
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But there was yet another, more 
severe scandal. Reynald Temarii, 
the vice president of the Fédération 
Internationale du Football Associa-
tion (fifa [soccer]), was suspended 
from office on 17 October 2010 
because he was under investigation 
for corruption. Temarii, as well as the 
Nigerian Amos Adamu, fifa execu-
tive board members for Oceania and 
Africa respectively, were charged 
with attempting to sell their votes for 
the 2018 Football World Cup host 
country decision. Journalists from 
the London Times posing as Ameri-
can lobbyists had asked Temarii how 
much it would cost to convince him to 
vote for the United States, and he had 
suggested a sum of several million dol-
lars. Even though the secretly recorded 
interview reveals that Temarii did 
not want to take the bribe personally 
but rather have it invested into the 
comparatively poor Oceania Football 
Federation, it was clearly a case of 
illegal bribery.
Former professional football player 
Temarii had served then President 
Gaston Flosse in various positions 
since 1991, had founded the Taho-
eraa youth organization Jeun’Orange, 
and was cabinet minister for youth 
and sports from 1998 to 2004. After 
Flosse lost power in 2004, Temarii 
founded his own splinter political 
party but then left local politics when 
he was offered a high position in fifa. 
In January 2010 he was promoted to 
fifa vice president, the first repre-
sentative of Oceania ever to hold that 
position. It goes without saying that 
this was the climax of a brilliant career 
envied by many a Tahitian, which 
made his irresponsible behavior all the 
more saddening (TPM, Nov 2010). On 
18 November, fifa decided to perma-
nently remove him from the executive 
board, suspend him for one year from 
all sports activities, and fine him 5,000 
Swiss francs (about us$5,675) (TPM, 
Dec 2010).
On 1 December, an opinion poll 
revealed that 97 percent of the popula-
tion was unsatisfied with the political 
situation, 90 percent had no trust in 
any of the current politicians, and 57 
percent wanted early elections in order 
to replace them with different leaders 
as well as a referendum on indepen-
dence within the next five years (TPM, 
Jan 2011).
The New Year started with a per-
sonnel change in the local representa-
tion of the French government. High 
Commissioner Adolphe Colrat, in 
office since July 2008, left his position 
on 7 January 2011 and returned to 
France to assume another administra-
tive post. He was replaced by Richard 
Didier, who was inaugurated on 22 
January. Since Didier was an advisor 
of former French President Jacques 
Chirac (a personal friend and sponsor 
of Gaston Flosse), speculations arose 
that his appointment was part of a 
still-functioning Chirac-Flosse support 
network (TPM, Feb 2011).
The Union Pour La Démocratie, on 
the other hand, has its French sup-
porters as well. On 23 January, former 
French Minister of Overseas Territo-
ries Christian Paul visited Tahiti to 
renew the convention of partnership 
between his French Socialist Party and 
Temaru’s pro-independence Tavini 
Huiraatira (People’s Servant) party, 
the leading component of upld (TPM, 
Feb 2011).
Meanwhile, judicial investigations 
and trials of various past corruption 
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scandals continued throughout the 
review period. Former directors of the 
territorial television station tntv, Eric 
Monod and Loïc Brigato, were sen-
tenced to suspended prison terms and 
fines for misuse of company property 
on 10 August (TPM, Sept 2010).
The main targets of judicial activity, 
however, were the numerous mis-
deeds of former President Flosse. The 
investigations received a new twist in 
January, when Oscar Temaru and his 
attorney, Stanley Cross, surprisingly 
withdrew their earlier complaint that 
a presidential intelligence unit that 
Flosse had established in violation of 
French law had spied on them and 
thus invaded their privacy (NT, 5 Jan 
2011; DT, 8 Jan 2011). Fears arose 
that the whole affair would be buried 
because of Flosse’s still-influential 
protection networks (TPM, March 
2011). However, Annie Rousseau 
and journalist Alex du Prel, two of 
the other original plaintiffs, refused 
to withdraw their suit, and the court 
announced that it would pursue 
investigations (TPM, April 2011). On 
18 April, another trial started in the 
Papeete Court against Flosse and 
eighty-six co-defendants for so-called 
fictional employments during Flosse’s 
semi-authoritarian presidency in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (TPM, May 
2011).
While Flosse has so far politically 
survived all trials, another leading 
politician, Émile Vernaudon, the for-
mer mayor of Mahina on Tahiti’s east 
coast, was indefinitely removed from 
politics, receiving a sentence both liter-
ally by the judiciary and figuratively 
by the voters. While serving as min-
ister for sports, postal services, and 
telecommunications in Oscar Temaru’s 
cabinet between 2004 and 2006, 
Vernaudon had embezzled about 170 
million cfp francs (about us$1.7 
million) from the postal budget for 
private purposes. During the last 
general municipal elections in March 
2008, Vernaudon had been reelected 
mayor in absentia while in deten-
tion awaiting trial. One year later, in 
another corruption affair of a smaller 
scale, he was sentenced to a suspended 
jail term, which removed him from 
office. When his probation term 
expired in late 2010, several of his 
party’s municipal councilors resigned 
in order to provoke a special election 
so that Vernaudon could be reelected 
to the council and regain the mayor-
alty. However, during the campaign 
in mid-January 2011, Vernaudon was 
convicted of embezzlement, sentenced 
to five years in prison, and sent to 
jail immediately (tp, 18 Jan 2011). 
A Court of Appeal confirmed the 
sentence on 23 June (TPM, Aug 2011). 
The special municipal elections on 30 
January and 6 February were won by 
a non-party-affiliated list, and their 
leading candidate, Patrice Jamet, was 
elected mayor by the newly consti-
tuted municipal council. Vernaudon’s 
list came in third, behind the local 
Tahoeraa list of Nicolas Sanquer (tp, 
6 Feb 2011). Evidently, the people 
of Mahina have had enough of their 
formerly popular mayor’s escapades, 
but besides this purely local inter-
pretation, the election results were 
also significant as an indication of 
a general  dissatisfaction with the 
traditional party system. By voting for 
an independent list, Mahina’s citizens 
rejected not only Vernaudon but also 
all the political parties represented in 
the assembly.
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Another scandal made headlines 
in mid-January when the president of 
the University of French Polynesia, 
Tahitian linguist Louise Peltzer, was 
accused of plagiarism because parts of 
her 1999 essay “Des Langues et des 
Hommes” (Languages and People) 
were found to be remarkably similar 
to the French translation of the 1993 
book La ricerca della lingua perfetta 
nella cultura europea (The Search for 
the Perfect Language in the European 
Culture) by Italian author Umberto 
Eco. Peltzer first reacted defensively 
and charged her critics with racial 
prejudice against her as the first Tahi-
tian at the helm of the university, but 
after she lost the confidence of most 
of the faculty, Peltzer resigned on 1 
April (TPM, May 2011). Eventually, 
archeologist Eric Conte was elected to 
succeed her (tp, 23 June 2011).
As the New Year progressed, the 
political crisis worsened. By Febru-
ary 2011, the political stalemate had 
gone on for more than nine months 
with no end in sight. Tong Sang was 
still president but leading a minority 
government with no chance to pass 
any legislation in the assembly. Since 
the opposition upld as well as the 
semi-opposition Tahoeraa refused to 
endorse the president’s 2011 budget 
proposal, Tong Sang suggested dis-
solution of the assembly and fresh 
elections to the French government, 
but at the same time kept refusing to 
resign (tp, 11 Feb 2011).
Because the 2007 modification of 
the Organic Law of French Polynesia 
provides severe consequences if the 
assembly does not pass the annual 
budget by March each year (see article 
34, section II, 2007 Organic Law of 
French Polynesia), pressure on the 
representatives increased. Finally, on 
20 February, a modified version of the 
budget proposal was passed by a solid 
majority of 43 votes out of a total of 
57 assembly members. This majority 
included UPLD and Tahoeraa, as well 
as Ia Ora Te Fenua (May the Land 
Live, a splinter group led by Jean-
Christophe Bouissou that had earlier 
broken away from To Tatou Aia), 
while the minority government caucus 
of To Tatou Aia abstained (tp, 20 Feb 
2011).
In a press conference, Tong Sang 
denounced the assembly vote, arguing 
that according to the Organic Law a 
budget vote could only be legitimate 
with the president’s approval. There-
fore, the French State Council (the 
highest court of France) was asked 
for its opinion (pir, 28 Feb 2011). 
Without waiting for the court’s deci-
sion, Tong Sang issued a decree that 
published his budget proposal in the 
official bulletin as the actual 2011 
government budget. By enacting a 
budget by executive decree, Tong Sang 
clearly overstepped his authority, and 
this unconstitutional act was the final 
nail in the coffin for his government. 
When five of his cabinet ministers, 
including Vice President Fritch and the 
other ministers from Tahoeraa, refused 
to endorse his budgetary decree, the 
president summarily dismissed them 
on 28 February. Among those dis-
missed was Minister of Economic 
Reconversion Teva Rohfritsch, who 
received the news of his immediate 
dismissal while representing French 
Polynesia at a conference of European 
Union–affiliated Overseas Territories 
in New Caledonia. This did not help 
to improve the international image of 
the country, already tarnished by years 
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of political instability (tp, 28 Feb 
2011).
Now reduced to a splinter group 
with only a handful of supporters in 
the assembly, Tong Sang’s minority 
government was still holding power 
since the opposition parties remained 
unable to find a common candi-
date and form a common platform 
that would enable a constructive 
no-confidence vote. During the last 
weeks of March, however, upld, 
with the largest caucus in the assem-
bly, carefully maneuvered behind the 
scenes to gather a bare majority of 
its own, without having to rely on 
the two other, pro-French opposi-
tion groups, Tahoeraa and Ia Ora Te 
Fenua. A motion of no confidence 
was introduced on 24 March (tp, 24 
March 2011). This was made possible 
when a few To Tatou Aia representa-
tives from the outer islands switched 
sides. In order to consolidate the new 
majority ideologically, upld required 
its new adherents to sign a declara-
tion demanding French Polynesia’s 
reinscription on the United Nations 
list of non-self-governing territories 
(from which France had unilaterally 
removed the country in 1947), a core 
element of upld’s platform. Follow-
ing negotiations that took place until 
the last minute, the political stalemate 
of more than a year was finally over, 
at least for the time being, when Tong 
Sang was overthrown on 1 April in a 
no-confidence motion and replaced 
once more by Oscar Temaru by a bare 
majority of twenty-nine votes (tp, 1 
April 2011).
On 6 April, Temaru presented his 
new cabinet of eleven ministers, most 
of them upld members as well as 
several newly “converted” former To 
Tatou Aia members from the outer 
islands. The new vice president is Ant-
ony Geros, who had already held the 
position in earlier Temaru-led cabinets 
(tp, 6 April 2011). On 14 May, upld 
caucus chairman Jacqui Drollet was 
elected Temaru’s successor as Speaker 
of the assembly (TPM, May 2011).
This change of government marked 
the end of Tong Sang’s third term in 
office since 2006 and the beginning of 
Temaru’s fifth term since 2004. What 
is interesting about this most recent 
act in French Polynesia’s political 
drama is the fact that the country is 
now headed for the first time by a 
government that has an explicit man-
date to push for decolonization on the 
international level. Temaru’s earlier 
majorities had always failed in this 
respect because they included repre-
sentatives opposed to independence 
who accused Temaru of breaking his 
promise to them to remain neutral 
in the decolonization question in 
exchange for their political support.
Another project of the new Temaru 
government is the introduction of a 
progressive income tax, which is cur-
rently nonexistent (tp, 4 April 2011). 
This would be an important step to 
curb the drastically increasing social 
inequalities in the country. But this 
plan is just as bold politically as the 
decolonization initiative, since politi-
cians and government officials are the 
main profiteers of both the French 
government subsidies and the current 
unjust taxation system.  
During the period under review, the 
government took the first steps to curb 
its spending by selling off unnecessary 
prestige objects. On 15 October, the 
Tong Sang government sold the his-
toric Rocklands Hostel in Auckland to 
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a New Zealand real estate agency for 
nz$5.1 million (us$4.2 million), much 
less than the purchase price paid by 
an earlier Temaru government in 2005 
(tp, 15 Oct 2010). On 10 March, the 
presidential airplane, bought by the 
Flosse government in the early 2000s 
and thus nicknamed “Air Flosse One,” 
was sold to a European syndicate 
on behalf of the Bhutanese national 
airline Druk Air for 6.2 million euros 
(about us$7.5 million) (TPM, April 
2011).
A more drastic step was taken by 
the new Temaru government when it 
decided to move the presidency out 
of the Flosse-era luxury presidential 
palace and into an older government 
building and to lease the palace to 
businesses. Vice President Geros 
stated that a colonial-style palace did 
not suit modern Tahiti and that when 
he and his colleagues entered the 
palace, they felt out of place. Accord-
ing to unconfirmed rumors, a Chinese 
bank and a hotel chain were interested 
in leasing the building (TPM, May 
2011). Following this trend, in late 
April, the French Development Agency 
told the French Polynesia government 
to sell the building that houses its 
office in Paris as well; otherwise the 
country would no longer receive loans 
from the agency (TPM, June 2011).
While all of these measures may 
have important symbolic meaning, it 
would be far more prudent in light of 
the country’s disastrous economic and 
financial situation for the administra-
tion to cut the excessive salaries of 
politicians as well as those of countless 
officials in the numerous and often 
unnecessary and incompetent govern-
ment departments, since the sum of 
all these salaries by far exceeds the 
maintenance cost for a few pretentious 
buildings. The only politician who has 
dared to take initiative in that direc-
tion thus far is Sabrina Birk (upld), 
who threatened to resign in protest of 
her colleagues’ refusal to enact drastic 
pay cuts. She decided to stay in the 
assembly but chose to accept less than 
one third of her monthly salary of 
630,000 cfp francs (about us$6,300) 
and donate the rest to a children’s 
aid organization. She also announced 
that she would pay her staff the same 
salary as herself and also make a 
charitable donation out of the rest of 
the 580,000 cfp francs she receives 
monthly to pay staff members (TPM, 
June–July 2011).
On 19 April, Papeete saw another 
union-led demonstration against the 
failure of successive governments to 
improve the economic situation. The 
whole protest, attended by about 
2,000 participants, was rather hypo-
critical, however, since it was once 
more led by people who benefit the 
most from the system (TPM, May 
2011). A few days before, assembly 
member Hiro Tefaarere, a former 
union official with a notorious past as 
a political turncoat, surprisingly told 
the naked truth on the floor of the 
assembly, denouncing both politicians 
and union officials and warning that 
the system could not go on like this 
(tp, 12 April 2011).
At the same time, the economic 
and social decay of the country is 
 becoming more and more visible. 
Not only has the number of home-
less in the streets of Papeete increased 
 dramatically (TPM, May 2009), 
one can also see more and more 
 abandoned buildings in downtown 
Papeete, some corners of which are 
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beginning to look like ghost towns. 
The reason is usually property owners’ 
lack of funds due to the bad economic 
situation (NT, 28 Dec 2010).
With no solution for the economic 
crisis in sight, it is not surprising that 
more and more people are leaving the 
country. Due to the artificial economic 
growth brought about by French 
subsidies in the past, French Polynesia 
used to be among the Pacific Island 
entities with the lowest number in the 
diaspora, but this is slowly changing. 
Tahitian expatriate communities are 
beginning to grow, mainly in New 
Caledonia, France, and francophone 
Canada (TPM, Aug 2010), but also in 
New Zealand, Hawai‘i, and the US 
West Coast.
One has to wonder why the local 
politicians, with quite a large amount 
of policy-making powers at their 
disposal, have been preoccupied 
with power struggles and have com-
pletely failed to make any significant 
improvements in the economic and 
social fields over the last couple of 
years. Attentively following the devel-
opments since the early 2000s, I have 
lately begun to speculate whether the 
irresponsible, and in the long run self-
destructive behavior of the political 
elites might not be a kind of subcon-
scious response to French colonial 
patronizing policies of the past and 
present. Since Tahitian politicians have 
been constantly treated like children 
(who are either to be repressed or to 
be spoiled), their reaction has indeed 
been to behave like children.
In this sense, the initiative of the 
new Temaru government to inter-
nationalize the issue by seeking to 
reinscribe the country on the United 
Nations list of non-self-governing ter-
ritories is a bold step. The opposition 
in the assembly, on the other hand, is 
running up against Temaru’s decolo-
nization plans. When a resolution to 
support reinscription was introduced 
by the cabinet to the assembly com-
mittee on institutional issues, the three 
“autonomist” (ie, anti-independence) 
opposition caucuses of Tahoeraa, 
To Tatou Aia, and Ia Ora Te Fenua 
denounced the government’s plan in a 
joint press statement and announced 
that they would fiercely resist the 
passing of the resolution. This led 
to an adjournment of debate on the 
resolution on the assembly floor until 
mid-August (tp, 21 June 2011).
Despite claims by the “autono-
mists” to the contrary, colonialism 
is alive and well in French Polynesia. 
Nothing shows this more clearly 
than the French government’s policy 
toward the Tahitian language. In May 
2011, the French ministry of educa-
tion announced plans to abolish the 
capes (certificat d’aptitude au profes-
sorat de l’enseignement du second 
degré [certificate of ability to teach in 
secondary education]) diploma for the 
teaching of so-called regional lan-
guages (including Tahitian) by 2012. 
This could jeopardize the official posi-
tion of the Tahitian language in French 
Polynesia’s education system, in which 
Tahitian can be chosen instead of a 
foreign language in collège and lycée 
(middle and high school) and in which 
Tahitian can be taken to satisfy the 
foreign language requirement in the 
baccalaureat (high school diploma). 
Representatives of various politi-
cal parties, of the Maohi Protestant 
Church (the country’s largest denomi-
nation), and the Tahitian Academy 
(the language commission) were out-
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raged over the plans. In early June, the 
Assembly of French Polynesia passed 
a unanimous resolution denouncing 
the education ministry’s plans and 
demanding to maintain the diploma. 
Speaker Jacqui Drollet stated that 
this was part of a colonial political 
strategy by the French government to 
further undermine Polynesian identity 
through language assimilation (tp, 14 
June 2011). Senator Richard Tuheiava, 
one of the two representatives of the 
country in the French Senate, consid-
ered the plan to be contradictory to 
the French constitution (which since a 
2008 amendment recognizes “regional 
languages”) as well as the UN Dec-
laration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which France ratified in 2007 
(tp, 30 May 2011). Led by the Tahi-
tian Academy and the Maohi Protes-
tant Church, hundreds demonstrated 
on June 26 in front of the Pouvanaa 
a Oopa monument in Papeete for the 
maintenance of the diploma (tp, 26 
June 2011).
It is quite apparent that Tahitian 
and other Polynesian languages are 
indeed threatened. Already, most 
young people speak French more 
often and more fluently than they do 
Tahitian, as a recent study by a French 
scholar has shown (Ferment Mear 
2010), and the French government’s 
colonialist policies are reinforcing the 
trend. On 6 October, the European 
Human Rights Court rejected a com-
plaint by assembly member Sabrina 
Birk against an earlier French govern-
ment ban on the official use of Tahi-
tian in the assembly (tp, 6 Oct 2010).
A continuation of French colonial-
ism is also apparent in the treatment 
of the victims of nuclear testing. Even 
though in 2010 France passed the 
so-called Morin Act, a law to enable 
the compensation of former test work-
ers suffering from radiation-related 
illnesses, the law contains numerous 
bureaucratic hurdles that prevent 
many victims from receiving recogni-
tion of their sufferings and, as a result, 
adequate compensation. Local nuclear 
test victims’ association Moruroa e 
Tatou repeatedly denounced the fail-
ings of the compensation process and 
demanded a revision of the Morin Act 
(tp, 17 Nov 2010, 30 June 2011).
Despite France’s continuing colo-
nial policies, however, its long-term 
interests in the country are becoming 
more and more dubious. An indica-
tion of this is the continuing military 
pullout. At the end of 2010, the com-
mander of military forces in French 
Polynesia, Rear Admiral Jérôme 
 Régnier, announced that 1,000 posi-
tions, including 750 military personnel 
and 250 civilian employees, will be cut 
by 2016 (DT, 20 Dec 2010).
Finally, yet another change in the 
political system is under way. After 
consultation with some of the lead-
ing local politicians, French Minister 
for Overseas Territories Marie-Luce 
Penchard introduced into the French 
legislature a bill for a new amendment 
to the French Polynesia Organic Act 
of 2004. After some debate, it was 
passed by the French Senate on 31 
May and was thereafter transferred to 
the National Assembly, the other legis-
lative chamber of the French Republic, 
where it was adopted at the end of 
June (tp, 30 June 2011). The bill pro-
poses to restore the one-third-of-seats 
bonus for the leading party, which was 
part of the 2004 organic law but had 
been removed in the last amendment 
of 2007. The election mode in two 
182 the contemporary pacific • 24:1 (2012)
rounds, on the other hand, with a 12.5 
percent threshold for admission to 
the second round, first introduced in 
2007, will be retained. Besides, the six 
current constituencies are to be deleted 
and replaced with a unitary constitu-
ency with several sections. Further-
more, constructive no-confidence 
votes will henceforth require a 60 
percent majority of representatives. All 
of these changes are supposed to cre-
ate more solid majorities and thereby 
decrease the country’s chronic insta-
bility. Unlike the 2007 amendment, 
Penchard’s bill is not intended to lead 
to a dissolution of the assembly and 
early elections, but rather it is sup-
posed to be applied to the next regular 
assembly elections in 2013 (rnzi, 1 
June 2011; tp, 2 June 2011, 15 July 
2011).
In French Polynesia, the bill met 
mixed reactions. Many Tahitian 
 politicians favor the creation of a 
unitary constituency, since this would 
lead to a more appropriate repre-
sentation of the political will of the 
country’s body politic. Representatives 
from the outer islands, on the other 
hand, criticized the deletion of the 
separate constituencies because they 
feared that this would lead to an even 
stronger dominance by Tahiti Island, 
which holds more than two-thirds of 
the country’s inhabitants, and further 
marginalize the outer islands. On 14 
April, the Assembly of French Polyne-
sia adopted a “reserved” (ie, neither 
for nor against, but skeptical) opin-
ion on the bill, and the two French 
Polynesia deputies in the National 
Assembly both criticized the adopted 
text and called for further modifica-
tions (tp, 30 June 2011). Altogether, 
however, the local political scene 
reacted far less critically than in 2007 
when Paris imposed the organic law 
reform against the explicit will of the 
assembly’s majority.
Leaving controversial politics aside 
and looking at some positive events 
in the cultural field, the period under 
review was also marked by milestones 
in the revival of traditional naviga-
tion. The race by two neo-traditional 
canoes to reach the 2010 Shanghai 
World Expo before its closing was 
won by neither team. One of the 
two canoes, O Tahiti Nui Freedom, 
reached Shanghai on November 22 
after a voyage of 114 days. After 
leaving Tahiti on 11 July, the voyage 
led through the Cook Islands, Niue, 
Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines. The goal of the voy-
age, led by Tahitian scientist Hiria 
Ottino, was to reversely duplicate 
the historic migration route of the 
Austronesian peoples—from southern 
China, through Taiwan and Southeast 
Asia, and into the insular Pacific—and 
thereby promote French Polynesia 
among the Expo visitors. Slowed by 
damage from several storms, the canoe 
arrived too late for the Expo, but the 
crew was nevertheless enthusiastically 
received by the Chinese authorities 
and greeted with a military honor 
guard in Shanwei Harbor, Guangdong 
(TPM, Dec 2010) 
The voyage of more than 15,000 
kilometers was one of the longest in 
the history of the modern revival of 
Polynesian navigation. The compet-
ing canoe, Upoo Tahiti, with owner 
Clément Pito and navigator Teiki 
Pambrun, was less fortunate. Pito and 
Pambrun, who had originally col-
laborated with Ottino on one single 
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project before having a falling out, 
chose a straight route through central 
Polynesia and Micronesia and decided 
to sail without an escort vessel or offi-
cial permits. Unfortunately, damage 
and other problems ended the voyage 
in Tuvalu, where the canoe was aban-
doned, and the crew returned to Tahiti 
(TPM, Oct 2010).
Another highlight in Polynesian 
navigation took place when a fleet of 
seven neo-traditional canoes, named 
Tavaru 2011, sailed from French 
Polynesia to Hawai‘i between April 
and June 2011. The fleet, sponsored 
by German philanthropist Dieter 
Paulmann and his marine protection 
foundation Okeanos, consisted of the 
Tahitian canoe Faafaite, one canoe 
each from the Cook Islands, S?moa, 
and Fiji, two from Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, and one with a pan-Pacific 
crew. The canoes had first gathered 
on Fakarava atoll in the Tuamotu 
Archipelago, then sailed to Nuku Hiva 
in the Marquesas Islands, and from 
there to Hilo on Hawai‘i Island, where 
they were enthusiastically greeted by 
Hawaiian religious and cultural lead-
ers. The voyage of more than 4,000 
kilometers between the Marquesas 
and Hawai‘i took the fleet only twelve 
days. After a tour of the Hawaiian 
Islands, the canoes plan to make a trip 
to the US West Coast and to hold a 
reunion in the Marquesas in Novem-
ber. Most significantly, Faafaite is the 
first neo-traditional Tahitian canoe to 
sail to Hawai‘i, a somewhat belated 
response to the famed voyage of the 
Hawaiian vessel H?k?le‘a to Tahiti in 
1976.
Besides these wonderful events, 
the country’s cultural scene suffered 
a terrible loss during the year under 
review. On 12 February, Jean-Marc 
Teraituatini Pambrun passed away in 
Paris at the age of fifty-seven. Pam-
brun was one of the most renowned 
contemporary Tahitian writers and 
artists. Among his numerous works 
are Le Sale Petit Prince (a collection 
of satirical short stories); Les Par-
fums du Silence (a play based on Paul 
Gauguin’s last years in the Marquesas 
Islands); and the novel Le Bambou 
Noir. Most of his literary works 
featured his own drawings. In 2006, 
Pambrun, a lifelong pro-independence 
activist, was appointed curator of the 
territorial museum, Musée de Tahiti et 
des Iles, in Punaauia by then President 
Oscar Temaru. As curator, Pam-
brun was responsible for a thorough 
renovation of the museum and several 
special exhibits featuring Polynesian 
artifacts from around the world. His 
last great literary work was a biog-
raphy of famed Tahitian poet and 
filmmaker Henri Hiro (1944–1990), 
which came out in late 2010. Strictly 
following his will, Pambrun’s funeral 
on Moorea Island was a rare occur-
rence, as it was celebrated with purely 
traditional, non-Christian ceremonies 
(TPM, March 2011).  
Besides Pambrun, a few other 
notable personalities passed away. 
Pierre Vérin, a former president of 
the University of French Polyne-
sia, died in July 2010 at the age of 
seventy-eight. Vérin was a French 
linguist and anthropologist who had 
become famous for his research in 
the Austral islands (TPM, Aug 2010). 
On 14 August, Chinese-Tahitian 
painter Francois Teriitehau passed 
away at sixty-five (TPM, Sept 2011), 
and on 11 September, fisherman 
Tavae Raioaoa died at age sixty-four. 
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Raioaoa had become famous in 2002, 
when, following engine damage, he 
survived 118 days drifting on an open 
boat before reaching Aitutaki in the 
Cook Islands, where a museum was 
subsequently built in his honor. His 
adventure has also been told in a book 
published in French and Tahitian (TPM, 
Oct 2010). Finally, on 16 January 
2011, René Calinaud, a former mag-
istrate and legal expert on land tenure 
matters who had served on the bench 
since 1959, left this world at the age 
of eighty (TPM, Feb 2011).
On a final note, the Catholic 
Church, the country’s second larg-
est religious denomination, had an 
important change in leadership. On 
31 March, Archbishop Hubert Cop-
penrath, in office since 1998, retired 
at the record age of eighty. In his 
stead, Pope Benedict XVI appointed 
Father Bruno Mai to serve as apostolic 
administrator of the archdiocese until 
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M?ORI ISSUES 
The year under review was one of 
shocking upheavals for M?ori in more 
ways than one. In August and Sep-
tember 2010 we lost some key lead-
ers. In September 2010, in February 
2011, and in June 2011, Christchurch 
suffered a series of earthquakes that 
left many M?ori families devastated 
and feeling abandoned as recovery aid 
passed them by. On the political scene, 
Prime Minister John Key finally got 
his wish when the M?ori Party forced 
H?ne Harawira out, only to have 
Harawira win a by-election for his 
Taitokerau seat and return to Parlia-
ment as the leader of the new Mana 
Movement. But the most bewildering 
development was the M?ori Party 
turning its back on its constituents 
and supporting the passage into law 
of the racist Marine and Coastal Area 
(Takutai Moana) Bill.
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On 17 August 2010, two very dif-
ferent leaders from different parts of 
the country passed away. In Taranaki, 
Te Miringa Hohaia died unexpect-
edly at the age of fifty-eight. He was a 
scholar, artist, and activist who spent 
his adult life fighting the injustices 
perpetrated on his Taranaki people by 
the British. He was trained and deeply 
skilled in the traditions, customs, 
and history of his ancestral home, 
Parihaka, a place renowned for the 
atrocities that the British committed 
there over many years. In the 1970s he 
was involved in the eventually success-
ful Treaty of Waitangi claims against 
the Crown to stop the pollution and 
despoliation of the seafood beds off 
the north Taranaki coast. In the 1990s 
he was one of the leaders of the com-
plex and successful Taranaki Treaty 
claims. In 2000 he co-curated the 
hugely successful landmark exhibition 
Parihaka, The Art of Passive Resis-
tance at Wellington’s City Gallery, 
and in 2005 he created the Parihaka 
International Peace Festival, which 
has become an annual celebration of 
the heritage of Taranaki (Ashworth, 
Hond, and Hohaia 2010; M?ori Party 
2010a). An obituary noted, “In life 
he was akin to his tupuna [ancestors], 
becoming perhaps the most hated 
person in the province among Pakeha 
in the 1980s as he fought the injustice 
of the pittance paid by leaseholders 
farming confiscated Taranaki Maori 
reserve land. . . . Opponents vilified 
him, echoing the 19th century settler 
reaction to the non-violent campaign 
of Parihaka founders Tohu and Te 
Whiti” (Ashworth, Hond, and Hohaia 
2010, 9).
On the east coast, Te Kapunga 
(Koro) Matemoana Dewes passed 
away. He was staunchly Ng?ti Porou, 
a scholar, a thinker, and the architect 
of the M?ori Studies Department at 
Victoria University in Wellington. 
There he challenged the dry, dusty 
approach to university teaching and 
scholarship imported from Britain, 
writing the first MA thesis in the 
M?ori language. However, he was 
passed over as the inaugural head of 
the department, so he left academia 
and returned home to his Ng?ti Porou 
roots to farm and work for his people. 
It was many years before Victoria Uni-
versity recognized his contributions. In 
2004 they awarded him an honorary 
doctorate in literature (Fox 2010).
In September 2010, Sir Archie John 
Te Atawhai Taiaroa passed away. He 
was Te Atihaunui a P?p?rangi, Ng?ti 
T?wharetoa, and Ng?ti Apa and 
chairman of the Whanganui River 
M?ori Trust Board. He played a key 
role in one of the nation’s longest 
running court cases—the Whanganui 
River claim. He took a number of 
leading roles tribally, nationally, and 
internationally. He was at the heart 
of the protracted M?ori fisheries 
struggles and a leader of the M?ori 
broadcasting litigation that spanned 
over twenty years and led to M?ori 
radio and television. He traveled to 
the United Nations, the International 
Whaling Commission, and the Privy 
Council in London to defend the 
rights of M?ori and indigenous people 
(M?ori Party 2010b; Harawira 2010).
On 8 September, the first earth-
quake hit Christchurch. It measured 
7.1 on the Richter scale and, while 
there was extensive damage to build-
ings in the central business district in 
particular, there was no loss of human 
life. Hundreds of aftershocks followed, 
186 the contemporary pacific • 24:1 (2012)
and a magnitude 6.3 quake on 22 
February 2011 claimed 181 lives and 
caused widespread damage, mostly to 
buildings and infrastructure already 
weakened by the September quake. 
On 13 June, a third quake, again of 
magnitude 6.3, followed a magnitude 
5.6 tremor, causing more damage. A 
major problem, particularly in the 
eastern suburbs, was liquefaction— 
liquid mud and silt forced above 
ground by each major quake.
In September and then again in 
February, the news media focused 
on the central business district where 
there was significant loss of life. 
While most suburban areas, includ-
ing the more wealthy areas, were not 
severely damaged, the poorer eastern 
suburbs, which are home to many 
M?ori, were greatly impacted. Water, 
power, and other services were quickly 
restored to the wealthy suburbs, but 
a fortnight after the February quake 
the eastern suburbs were still without 
power, water, sewerage, food, shops, 
money, petrol, passable roads, and 
other necessities. One livid M?ori 
reporter noted that “officials from the 
Prime Minister down . . . were seem-
ingly oblivious to the real life human 
tragedy taking place where tens of 
thousands of people were without . . .
necessities we take for granted in mod-
ern society” (Fox 2011, 11). In the 
days following the February quake, 
thousands left Christchurch, making 
their way home to their own tribal 
areas. Many marae (M?ori communal 
meeting places) north of the disaster 
area looked after weary, shaken travel-
ers, who arrived with only the clothes 
on their backs, hungry, unwashed, 
and with little fuel in their tanks (Fox 
2011, 12).
In July 2010, Professor James 
Anaya, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples, warned the government 
about its mistreatment of M?ori. In 
a preliminary statement issued at the 
end of his weeklong visit he said, “I 
cannot help but note the extreme dis-
advantage in the social and economic 
conditions of the M?ori people” 
(Anaya 2010). His 2011 report to 
the UN Human Rights Committee 
acknowledged the advances the New 
Zealand government had made by, for 
example, formally expressing sup-
port for the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2010. 
However, Anaya also pointed out a 
number of serious ongoing problems, 
including the lack of adequate legal 
protection for the human rights of 
M?ori as citizens and their rights to 
their lands and resources; the short-
comings, inadequacy, and unfairness 
of the treaty settlement process; and 
the extreme disadvantage in the social 
and economic conditions of the M?ori 
people in comparison to the rest of 
New Zealand society (Anaya 2011).
One of the areas the special rap-
porteur warned about was the Marine 
and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) 
Bill that was before the House. He 
pointed out that the bill “should be 
in line with international standards 
regarding the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their traditional lands and 
resources” (Anaya 2011, 2). As a 
result of the agreement entered into 
by the ruling National Party and the 
M?ori Party, the government agreed 
to repeal the previous government’s 
loathed and discriminatory Foreshore 
and Seabed Act 2004. It was to be 
replaced by the Marine and Coastal 
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Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. The 
M?ori Party gave assurances that 
the legislation would respect M?ori 
wishes and the influential National 
Iwi Chairs Forum conducted extensive 
discussions with the government to 
ensure that it would uphold M?ori 
rights. In the end, the National Party 
government ignored both of them. It 
drew up legislation that was just as 
racist and discriminatory as the 2004 
act and then looked to its coalition 
partner, the M?ori Party, to get it past 
the inevitable M?ori objections. Much 
to the dismay of M?ori, rather than 
rejecting National’s racist bill, the 
M?ori Party supported it, and in doing 
so, turned its back on its  constituents. 
The 2011 act, like the 2004 act, 
confiscates the foreshore and seabed 
territories of 660,000 M?ori while 
protecting the 12,500 non-M?ori title 
holders who occupy land in the same 
area. The only M?ori Party member of 
Parliament prepared to fight for M?ori 
rights to their lands and resources 
was H?ne Harawira, and his refusal 
to stop criticizing the bill, the govern-
ment, and his M?ori Party colleagues 
resulted in the M?ori Party dumping 
him.
Despite repeated advice from M?ori 
groups regarding their opposition to 
the bill, the M?ori Party continued 
to claim that they had support for it. 
In December and again in February, 
the M?ori Party co-leaders appeared 
before the National Iwi Chairs Forum 
and made the bewildering statement 
that because they were now part of 
the government, they were now the 
Crown. As such, they argued, they had 
little choice but to accept the National 
Party’s bill as the “best they could 
do.” The magnitude of the M?ori Par-
ty’s betrayal of its constituents became 
clear when submissions regarding the 
bill that had been made to the M?ori 
Affairs Select Committee were ana-
lyzed. Of the seventy-two submissions 
received from representatives of tra-
ditional M?ori groupings throughout 
the country, only one had supported 
the bill—and that was a tribal body, 
Te R?nanga o Ng?ti Porou, that had 
negotiated their own deal with the 
government. The seventy-one other 
submissions either opposed the bill in 
its entirety, demanding its withdrawal, 
or insisted on significant amendments 
(Kaitiaki o te Takutai, 2011).
The dumping of H?ne Harawira 
caused disquiet in the M?ori com-
munity, and it was not only the M?ori 
Party’s failure with regard to the 
Marine and Coastal Area Bill that was 
troubling. The dumping itself was a 
clumsy affair that looked suspiciously 
like the M?ori Party was carrying out 
the prime minister’s frequently and 
publicly expressed admonitions that 
they get rid of him (Mutu 2011a, 227–
229; Francis 2010). Yet the National 
government, which the prime minister 
leads, with its policies of looking after 
the wealthy, was causing increasing 
hardship for many M?ori families and 
communities. Having seen and heard 
the pain of M?ori families, Harawira 
had become increasingly strident in 
his criticisms of the government. He 
also reminded his own party that its 
mandate was to represent M?ori, not 
to kowtow to the National Party. 
Yet the M?ori Party seemed unable 
to recognize that being wedded to 
National was alienating them from 
their constituents. In the months after 
his dumping, Harawira launched a 
new political movement, Mana, which 
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advocated M?ori leadership to protect 
M?ori, workers, the unemployed, 
the poor, and the disenfranchised. 
Mana drew support from both M?ori 
and non-M?ori. In May, Harawira 
resigned from Parliament, forcing a 
by-election for the Taitokerau (M?ori) 
seat. Despite vigorous campaigning 
by other parties, he was returned 
to Parliament as the leader of the 
Mana Movement with a comfortable 
majority. The M?ori Party candidate 
received only 8 percent of the vote.
Harawira’s criticisms of the 
 government echoed mounting unease 
and dissatisfaction in the M?ori 
 community. Concerns had been 
increasing across the board as the 
government seemed intent on open-
ing its coffers to the wealthy while 
increasing the taxes of the poor. 
nz$1.7 billion was paid out to the 
investors of the failed South Canter-
bury Finance Company (NZH, 11 April 
2011); more than nz$34 million in 
incentives and subsidies along with 
changes to New Zealand employment 
law were given to Warner Brothers 
to keep the filming of The Hobbit in 
New Zealand (NZH, 28 Oct 2010); and 
nz$36 million was paid to fund Team 
New Zealand’s challenge for the 2013 
America’s Cup yacht race (NZH, 28 
April 2011). On top of this were the 
tax cuts whose main beneficiaries are 
the wealthy. Offsetting these costs was 
a 2.5 percent increase in the goods and 
services tax (to 15 percent), a tax that 
hits low-income earners hard and the 
unemployed and social welfare benefi-
ciaries even harder. M?ori unemploy-
ment is at 13.5 percent, more than 
twice the national rate of 6.5 percent 
(Department of Labour 2011), and 31 
percent of M?ori receive social welfare 
benefits. Additionally, the nz$1 bil-
lion budgeted in 1994 to settle all 
M?ori historical Treaty of Waitangi 
claims has still not been spent. Despite 
international advice and M?ori insis-
tence that the lands, territories, and 
resources that have been stolen from 
them be returned along with adequate 
compensation, the government contin-
ues to impose settlements valued at an 
average of 0.1 percent of the esti-
mated value of the assets stolen (Mutu 
2011b, 157) and refuses to pay com-
pensation. Each settlement is assigned 
a monetary value, but most of that is 
retained by the government as it forces 
claimants to pay for their own lands. 
One Far North iwi (tribal grouping), 
Ng?ti Kahu, has referred to these 
retained funds as “ransom monies” 
and has refused to pay them. Instead 
they have returned to the Waitangi 
Tribunal to seek orders forcing the 
government to return their lands and 
to pay compensation. Since the 1990s, 
governments have vowed to repeal the 
tribunal’s powers to make such orders 
if they ever attempt to do so (Mutu 
2011b, 108).
On top of all this, the govern-
ment incurred the wrath of two large 
East Coast iwi, Ng?ti Porou and Te 
Wh?nau a Apanui, when it allowed 
the Brazilian oil giant Petrobras to 
start exploring for oil in their territo-
rial seas. Apart from the fact that the 
oil belongs to those iwi, the threat to 
the well-being of the seas was of major 
concern. A flotilla of protest vessels 
authorized by the iwi shadowed the 
company vessels until they packed up 
early and left. Shameless government 
appropriation and exploitation of iwi 
oil and gas resources have resulted in 
at least two Waitangi Tribunal reports 
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upholding iwi claims to ownership of 
their own resources. Yet in Taranaki, 
where governments have been making 
many millions of dollars every year for 
over one hundred years from oil and 
gas, not one cent of the income has 
been shared with its rightful owners.
Despite the inevitable animos-
ity that this type of behavior fosters 
between governments and M?ori, 
the so-called settlements continued 
around the country. Office of Treaty 
Settlements reports indicate that 
since 1989, twenty-six claims have 
been “settled” and ten await their 
settlement  legislation to be enacted. 
Fourteen claimant groups have signed 
some form of Agreement in Prin-
ciple, and twenty claimant groups 
are in  negotiations with the govern-
ment (Mutu 2005, 204; OTS 2011, 
6–8). Those completed over the past 
year include Te Whare W?nanga 
o Awanui?rangi, which received a 
nz$14.5 million  contribution toward 
the costs of establishing its M?ori-
focused tertiary institution following 
a successful claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal in 1999.
On a brighter note, the Independent 
M?ori Statutory Board to the Auck-
land City Council has proved far more 
effective than the three seats for M?ori 
on the Council, which the government 
refused to create. Legislation setting 
up the board has ensured M?ori rep-
resentation on all relevant city council 
committees, much to the annoyance of 
several outspoken non-M?ori council 
members. But the annoyance turned 
to fury when funding requirements set 
out in the legislation meant that the 
council had to adequately fund the 
board. Attempts by the racist elements 
within the council to cut funding for 
the board failed when the board took 
the council to the high court in order 
to force it to abide by the legislation 
(NZH, 13 April 2011).
Another bright spot occurred when 
the Black Ferns, New Zealand Wom-
en’s Rugby team, won the Women’s 
Rugby World cup. Most team mem-
bers are M?ori, and they won despite 
a lack of funding and the New Zea-
land Rugby Union withdrawing sup-
port (M?ori Party 2010c).
margaret mutu
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Rapa Nui
Conflict between Rapa Nui people 
and the Chilean state escalated during 
the review year and peaked in Decem-
ber 2010 as Chilean military and 
police forces committed state violence 
against Rapa Nui. While the intensity 
of conflict has lessened since Decem-
ber, Rapa Nui continue to engage 
in large-scale public demonstrations 
against the Chilean state as of June 
2011. Interpreting the conflict is prob-
lematic given that there are compet-
ing discursive grounds by which it 
can be framed (see Young this issue; 
Young 2011), and because most of the 
information available is represented 
in Chilean media, not controlled by 
Rapa Nui people. Herein I focus on 
representations of the conflict primar-
ily in terms of the ways it is portrayed 
by scattered Rapa Nui voices in the 
international media.
At the close of the last review 
(Gonschor 2011), Rapa Nui were 
noted as embroiled in demonstrations 
sparked by the Chilean state appoint-
ment of Petero Edmunds Paoa as the 
new governor of Rapa Nui. Following 
the solar eclipse celebrations in July, 
conflict intensified as a number of 
hua‘ai (extended families) reclaimed 
hua‘ai lands currently occupied by 
Chilean state institutions and busi-
nesses, such as the Ministry of Public 
Works, the Ministry of the Interior, the 
municipality, the public school, part 
of a museum, and the Hangaroa Eco 
Village and Spa (Indigenous News, 
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3 Aug 2010). Lands began to be 
reclaimed on Friday, 30 July (emol, 2 
Aug 2010). By Wednesday, 4 August, 
a total of eleven lands occupied by 
state institutions had been reclaimed 
(emol, 4 Aug 2010). Among the 
hua‘ai reportedly involved were Atan, 
Chavez/Teave, Haoa, Hito, Huke, 
Hotus, Ika, Pakarati, Pate, Rapu, 
Tepano, and Tuki (emol, 2 Aug 
2010; The Clinic, 15 Sept 2010; ST, 4 
Aug 2010; Te Rapa Nui website, Aug 
2010)—some of the largest and most 
powerful of the thirty-six total hua‘ai 
on the island. Hua‘ai members set up 
tents, cooking grills, and fire pits on 
the reclaimed lands (The Clinic blog, 
15 Sept 2010).
Hua‘ai members who were directly 
or indirectly involved in the conflict 
represented the reclaiming of land as 
a response to a range of problems. 
Some hua‘ai reclaimed lands against 
privatization. This was the case in the 
attempt of the Hito hua‘ai to reclaim 
land occupied by the new high-end 
hotel, the Hangaroa Eco Village and 
Spa. The us$50 million hotel is a 
development of Cristoph Schiess, the 
chief executive of one of the largest 
private companies in Chile, Empresas 
Transoceanica (ap, 7 Feb 2011). Resis-
tance to privatization was also funda-
mental to the Haoa hua‘ai’s reclaiming 
of lands occupied by municipal institu-
tions. Reina Haoa, an eighty-five-year-
old woman, emphasized that she had 
provided the municipality land to use 
in order to improve the functioning 
of the town at the request of her son 
Alfonso, who was mayor at the time. 
On learning that new state leaders 
hoped to privatize and sell this land 
she stated, “I went from my home and 
I came to get my land and I will stay 
here until I die” (The Clinic blog, 15 
Sept 2010; translated from Spanish).
Some hua‘ai members stressed 
broader social and cultural problems. 
Piru Huke Atan, a hua‘ai member 
involved in the reclaiming of land at 
the Chilean governor’s building in 
Rapa Nui, represented the reclaiming 
of ancestral lands as part of a struggle 
to retain the integrity of Rapa Nui as 
a people (pir, 17 Aug 2010). Hua‘ai 
members felt threatened as a people, 
in part because of increasing Chilean 
settlement on the island. Angela Tuki 
Chavez complained, “Everything they 
do here goes badly. Especially immi-
gration—it’s not immigration, it’s an 
invasion. The state doesn’t listen to us 
as a distinct ethnic group” (National 
Public Radio, 9 Sept 2010). Valeria 
Pakarati saw the conflict in terms 
of social inequality; she emphasized 
that Rapa Nui are reclaiming land 
in a context where Chilean officials 
have housing while Rapa Nui increas-
ingly have nowhere to live (lt, 3 Aug 
2010). Such concerns were echoed by 
other Rapa Nui. Tiare Paoa empha-
sized problems of health, pollution, 
power, and assimilation resulting from 
current state policies in Rapa Nui 
(ec, 9 Aug 2010). One anonymous 
Rapa Nui commentator stated that 
“the reality we live in today is one of 
being crammed into a ghetto called 
Ha?a Roa. Our families are fighting 
for a couple of crumbs of land for the 
children and grandchildren, and there 
is no space to plant even a potato” 
(ec, 9 Aug 2010; translated from the 
Spanish).
Other hua‘ai members framed the 
issue in more political terms. Tuhiira 
Tuki conceived of hua‘ai resistance 
as a struggle for “a better future for 
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our children, and not a life as we live 
in today. To reach this end, we have 
to be in charge of our lives, our land 
and everything that goes with it: laws 
and social development” (ec, 9 Aug 
2010; translated from Spanish). Santi 
Hitorangi, a member of the hua‘ai 
that reclaimed the land occupied by 
the Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa, 
contextualized the conflict in terms 
of international and national law. 
He stated, “The root of the current 
revolution is based in the Chilean’s 
continued occupation and systematic 
abuse of the Rapanui people, in viola-
tion of the United Nations laws on 
political decolonization and today also 
the International Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People, to which 
Chile became a signatory in 2007. 
Chile’s actions also violate Chile’s 
own Indigenous Laws, which make 
it illegal for non-Rapanui people to 
own land on the island. The Chilean 
government has continued to condone 
abuses relating to health, usurpation 
of lands, and endangerment of the 
fragile environment and eco-system of 
the island by unrestricted immigration 
of foreigners and Chilean nationals” 
(pir, 17 Aug 2010). Alfonso Rapu 
Haoa, the leader of resistance in the 
1960s that led to the end of military 
rule and to some civil rights for Rapa 
Nui in Chile, also emphasized the 
conflict as a struggle for self-determi-
nation. In a letter addressed to Chilean 
President Sebastián Piñera that was 
later circulated in the media, he stated, 
“We want issues to be decided on 
Easter Island where it belongs: in this 
territory and by the Rapa Nui people” 
(ec, 16 Sept 2010).
Hua‘ai members were supported 
by Rapa Nui leaders working within 
and outside of Chilean institutions on 
the island. Luz Zasso Paoa, mayor of 
the Chilean-organized municipality 
of Ha?a Roa, and Governor Petero 
Edmunds Paoa were sympathetic to 
the hua‘ai in some reports. Governor 
Edmunds Paoa framed the actions as 
part of decades of Rapa Nui conflict 
with the state; Mayor Zasso Paoa 
represented the conflict as a response 
to ongoing state failures to reduce 
Chilean migration to the island, to 
reconstitute hua‘ai lands, and to estab-
lish real autonomy for Rapa Nui (ST, 
4 Aug 2010). Leviante Araki, current 
president of the grassroots political 
organization Rapa Nui Parliament, 
threatened that the conflict could 
lead to Rapa Nui independence from 
Chile (emol, 4 Aug 2010). (The 
Rapa Nui Parliament developed from 
the original hua‘ai-based Rapa Nui 
Council of Elders, which disbanded 
when a faction led by Alberto Hotus 
was incorporated into the Chilean 
state; the council retained the name 
but its makeup was no longer deter-
mined by hua‘ai.) Mario Tuki, who 
is an elected member of the Chilean 
state–based Development Commission 
for Easter Island (codeipa) as well as 
a member of the Rapa Nui Parliament, 
supported Leviante’s call for indepen-
dence (EM, 6 Aug 2010).
Initially, the state responded to the 
August events diplomatically. Raúl 
Celis, mayor of the fifth region of 
Chile, which includes Rapa Nui, met 
with Rapa Nui elder representatives of 
all thirty-six hua‘ai along with Chilean 
officials to discuss the conflict in a 
series of meetings. He acknowledged 
that Chile had failed to fulfill prom-
ises dating to the 1960s and earlier. 
Celis proposed to resolve conflict with 
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amendments to current Chilean land 
tenure laws. Interestingly, while Celis 
dismissed the threat of independence 
by the Rapa Nui Parliament, Mata 
Atan, a leading representative of the 
hua‘ai, emphasized that the call for 
independence was reasonable in light 
of the decades of Chilean state failures 
in Rapa Nui (emol, 5 Aug 2010).
In a move to reduce tensions and 
facilitate conflict resolution, Governor 
Petero Edmunds Paoa resigned on 9 
August 2010 (bbc Mundo, 12 Aug 
2010). He resigned under accusations 
of corruption for supporting the con-
tested development of the Hangaroa 
Eco Village and Spa (Torrealba 2010), 
and for favoring other Chilean-based 
developers who supported him as 
mayor and helped him gain appoint-
ment as governor (ST, 8 Sept 2010). To 
readers of past reviews of Rapa Nui in 
this journal, conflict regarding Petero 
Edmunds Paoa should come as no 
surprise. Edmunds Paoa, like Alberto 
Hotus, the president of the Chilean 
state–organized Council of Elders, has 
often supported lucrative develop-
ment projects and policies strongly 
contested by the majority of the Rapa 
Nui population, such as a casino on 
the island (Gonschor 2008, 239) and a 
watered-down autonomy bill com-
posed with little formal dialogue with 
Rapa Nui hua‘ai members (Gonschor 
2007). Carmen Cardinali Paoa was 
ultimately appointed to take his place 
(ST, 8 Sept 2010).
However, Edmunds Paoa’s resigna-
tion did not lead to any resolution or 
significant change in the conflict. By 
the latter part of August, Rapa Nui 
hua‘ai had reclaimed an estimated 
thirty-five lands (Torrealba 2010). 
On 9 August, Chilean Minister of the 
Interior Rodrigo Hinzpeter formed 
a committee to address three specific 
issues: the special status of the island, 
immigration regulation, and land con-
flict. The committee’s mandate was 
to propose solutions to the conflicts 
within sixty days. Dialogue between 
hua‘ai members and the Chilean state 
dissolved as Celis threatened state vio-
lence against Rapa Nui and requested 
that forty-five members of Chilean 
special forces be brought to the island 
to assist conflict resolution. Raul 
Teao, a Rapa Nui codeipa mem-
ber, emphasized that because Celis 
threatened violence, Rapa Nui ceased 
negotiations (ST, 9 Aug 2010). Rapa 
Nui Parliament leaders responded by 
sending a letter to the Pacific Islands 
Forum and Chilean President Piñera, 
requesting independence from Chile 
(otr, 18 Aug 2010). At gunpoint, the 
majority of an estimated 1,000 Rapa 
Nui were forced to end reclamations 
of ancestral land occupied by colonial 
Chilean institutions on 17 August (ST, 
18 Aug 2010). Hito hua‘ai members 
continued to reclaim the lands occu-
pied by the Hangaroa Eco Village and 
Spa, despite risking harm and death 
(pir, 20 Aug 2010).
In September, the government 
announced that more than thirty land 
titles for land in the Vaitea region 
would be released to Rapa Nui hua‘ai 
within sixty days. While some Rapa 
Nui who were to receive titles were 
excited about the prospect, Marisol 
Hito, the main spokesperson for the 
Hito hua‘ai (the hua‘ai in conflict with 
the Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa), 
emphasized that the lands scheduled 
for titles in the Vaitea region had 
nothing to do with the ancestral lands 
being reclaimed in Ha?a Roa (ST, 16 
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Sept 2010). Not surprisingly, hua‘ai 
members began to reclaim the lands 
that they had been forced from in 
August. Despite the September prom-
ise of titles, by October a reported 
eighteen of the total thirty-six Rapa 
Nui hua‘ai had reclaimed buildings 
they had been forced from in August 
(ST, 12 Oct 2010).
Amid the protracted conflict, the 
annual celebrations usually held on 
the island to celebrate the annexation 
of Rapa Nui by Chile on 9 September 
and the independence of Chile on 18 
September were suspended. Governor 
Cardinali in part canceled the event 
because the place where it is usually 
conducted had been reclaimed by 
hua‘ai members (emol, 9 Sept 2010). 
Though it was later reported that she 
had initially hoped to have the cel-
ebration (emol, 17 Sept 2010), she 
ultimately saw the event as inappro-
priate in the political context (emol, 
9 Sept 2010). In contrast, Alberto 
Hotus, president of the Chilean-
organized Council of Elders—a man 
whom many Rapa Nui derogatively 
nickname both “Kete” (pockets, as 
“in the pocket” of the Chilean govern-
ment) and “Hokotahi n?” (someone 
who stands alone)—once again dem-
onstrated his lack of connection with 
the Rapa Nui people he is formally 
supposed to represent. He conducted a 
private celebration of annexation with 
Chilean officials aboard a navy ship 
off the coast of Rapa Nui (emol, 9 
Sept 2010).
In October, at the international 
level, attorney Leonardo Crippa of the 
Indian Law Resource Center (ilrc) 
in Washington DC filed precaution-
ary measures with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 
(iachr) to stop Chilean forces from 
using state violence against hua‘ai 
members who were reclaiming lands 
(ilrc, 7 Feb 2011). The measures 
were filed on the basis of a fact-find-
ing mission Crippa had conducted in 
August and in light of the September 
eviction of Hito hua‘ai members from 
Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa, the 
arrival of additional Chilean forces, 
and the history of Chilean violence 
toward its indigenous peoples (Crippa, 
pers comm, June 2011). As the 
sixty-day Interior Ministry commit-
tee review drew to a close in October, 
the Chilean government announced 
its proposals for resolving conflict in 
Rapa Nui. The state highlighted an 
“investment plan” of us$203.4 mil-
lion (pir, 26 Oct 2010), which would 
utilize more than twenty times the 
total amount the state appropriated 
for Rapa Nui over the past fifteen 
years. The proposal included bills to 
improve land title transfers, clarify 
the boundaries of the national park, 
improve health care, increase infra-
structure, and improve the conserva-
tion of the environment and cultural 
heritage (ST, 25 Oct 2010). Minister 
of the Interior Hinzpeter discussed the 
investment plan and other matters of 
concern (land titles, migration, and 
the special status of the island) with 
select Rapa Nui at the public school 
auditorium for five hours (emol, 23 
Oct 2010).
While some Rapa Nui appear to 
have been interested in the state’s 
proposal to resolve the conflict with 
promises of financial investment, 
more discussion, and further commit-
tees, many clearly were dissatisfied. 
Mario Tuki emphasized that that the 
proposal did not really address the 
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concerns of Rapa Nui hua‘ai, and that 
only some hua‘ai had been invited to 
the meeting with  Hinzpeter. Mario fur-
ther stressed that the land titles were 
limited to just three extended families 
while the rest were not addressed. 
Hinzpeter alienated the Hito hua‘ai, 
as he did not meet with the family 
members to discuss their conflict with 
the Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa (ST, 
25 Oct 2010). Nor did he meet with 
members of the Rapa Nui Parlia-
ment (pir, 27 Oct 2010). Raul Teao, 
a codeipa member, characterized 
the state’s development plan as mere 
“pills” that did not address the more 
fundamental demands for true politi-
cal autonomy for Rapa Nui (emol, 26 
Oct 2010).
Thus it was no surprise that as 
Hinzpeter tried to fly away, demon-
strations at the airport delayed the 
departure for an hour (emol, 26 Oct 
2010). As Angela Tuki Chavez noted is 
typical of the Chilean state, it appears 
the officials “‘ina he hakaro?o” (did 
not listen). None of the comments 
made by Rapa Nui explaining the rec-
lamations of land mentioned earlier in 
this review explicitly discussed a need 
for a new Chilean “investment plan” 
or lands in Vaitea. At issue were ances-
tral lands in Ha?a Roa and the island 
as a whole, as well as demands for 
self-determination and independence. 
While it supposedly does address some 
of the social concerns mentioned by 
some Rapa Nui, it is clear that Chile’s 
plan failed to confront the more fun-
damental concerns regarding ancestral 
Rapa Nui lands and the question of 
autonomy or independence for Rapa 
Nui. Interestingly, Erity Teave, execu-
tive director for human rights within 
the Rapa Nui Parliament and long-
time spokesperson for Rapa Nui at the 
United Nations, has recently empha-
sized that the investment plan is not 
actually focused on problems of the 
Rapa Nui people at all (pers comm, 
Aug 2011). Her research has suggested 
that the plan is primarily connected to 
Chilean international trade interests 
as projected participants in various 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(apec) programs. According to Erity, 
the investment plan centers on the 
development of a new port, as well 
as a project for airport expansion to 
increase international trade between 
Asia and Chile.
On 3 December, Chilean military 
and police forces began acts of state 
violence against unarmed Rapa Nui 
men, women, and children. Violence 
began at dawn as forty-five Chil-
ean special forces entered a house 
reclaimed by members of several 
hua‘ai at the center of town, under 
a court order requested by Special 
Prosecutor Guillermo Felipe Merino 
and signed by local Judge Bernardo 
Toro (ec, 3 Dec 2010). Esther, 
Roberto, and Verena Ika Pakarati, 
as well as Margarita Pakarati Tuki, 
Ricardo Hito Tuki, and Miguel Tuki 
Atan were arrested (ec, 3 Dec 2010; 
emol, 4 Dec 2010; rnp, 5 Dec 2010). 
According to Verena, “The police 
arrived at the house, knocked loudly 
and violently entered. It was like a 
war between us and them. We were all 
crushed” (ls, 4 Dec 2010; translated 
from Spanish). State violence occurred 
in spite of the fact that Claudio Hito 
Tuki confronted the Chilean special 
forces with paperwork indicating the 
precautionary measures filed with 
the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Following the arrests, 
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Chilean special forces burned Rapa 
Nui flags that surrounded the house 
(ec, 3 Dec 2010).
As Rapa Nui began to protest the 
violent eviction, conflict escalated fur-
ther when the special forces proceeded 
to fire rubber bullets and tear gas 
into the gathering crowd of Rapa Nui 
(rnp, 3 Dec 2010). Twenty-one Rapa 
Nui were reported injured during the 
events, which long-standing social 
anthropologist of Rapa Nui Grant 
McCall characterized as “government 
thuggery” (2010). Four children were 
reported injured (Indigenous Peoples 
Issues and Resources website, 4 Dec 
2010). Mario Pakarati, Zita Atan, 
Pia Vargas, Claudio Tuki, Enrique 
Tepano, Honu Tepano, and Santi 
Hitorangi were all shot with rubber 
bullets (rnp, 3 Dec 2010). A total of 
seventeen were hospitalized (LT, 4 Dec 
2010). Jose Riroroko was beaten on 
the head with a police baton (RNP, 3 
Dec 2010). Ricardo Tepano was the 
most seriously injured: he was shot 
in the face at close range and lost an 
eye (rnp, 5 Dec 2010). Rapa Nui 
Parliament President Leviante Araki 
was shot in the hip twice (rnp, 3 Dec 
2010), as well as strangled and beaten 
to the ground by four policemen (EC, 
3 Dec 2010). He and Ricardo Tepano 
were flown to Chile for medical care. 
Rapa Nui emphasized that those 
arrested in the conflict were denied 
medical care and sufficient heat while 
incarcerated (EM, 4 Dec 2010). Vio-
lent state evictions continued in late 
December. On 29 December dozens 
of Rapa Nui were beaten with clubs 
by one hundred Chilean special forces 
around the central plaza of Ha?a Roa 
(ST, 3 Jan 2011).
Chilean officials responsible for 
the violence represented the evictions 
as necessary; however, other Chilean 
leaders questioned the use of force. 
Chilean President Piñera thought that 
the evictions were justified methods 
for reestablishing social order (ST, 
14 Jan 2011). Regional Mayor Raúl 
Celis claimed that the actions were 
necessary given Rapa Nui resistance 
(emol, 4 Dec 2010). According to 
Minister of the Interior Hinzpeter, 
“The police forces acted in compli-
ance with a court order. That’s how 
institutions function, and we all must 
follow them. There is a limit to these 
things and it was reached when there 
are illegal takeovers that cause dam-
age to the island” (New York Times, 
4 Dec 2010). Chilean Senator Alejan-
dro Navarro, on the other hand, was 
concerned that excessive force was 
used against the Rapa Nui (EM, 4 Dec 
2010). Chilean Senators Juan Pablo 
Letelier and Ricardo Lagos Weber also 
questioned the treatment of Rapa Nui 
and wondered if the state had ade-
quately discussed alternative solutions 
with Rapa Nui (emol, 4 Dec 2010). 
Senator Letelier accused the judge who 
administered the court order of abuse 
and violation of United Nations Inter-
national Labour Organization (ilo) 
Convention 169, which had been rati-
fied by the Chilean government (ST, 
6 Dec 2010). Chilean Congressman 
Hugo Gutiérrez also condemned the 
actions of the Chilean government and 
urged officials to immediately develop 
an autonomy statute for Rapa Nui 
(McCall 2010).
In January 2011, Rapa Nui 
characterized the island as “a war 
zone.” Three Chilean war ships were 
observed circling the island. Julie 
Brown Tuki was beaten outside her 
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home by twenty police and arrested 
for criminal trespass along with her 
cousin Tony Tuki (rnp, 21 Jan 2011). 
The Hito hua‘ai encountered some 
success, however, as the Valparaíso 
Court of Appeals disqualified Chilean 
Judge Bernardo Toro in Rapa Nui 
from presiding over the criminal case 
against seventeen hua‘ai members on 
12 January (lt, 12 Jan 2011). As a 
result, the court deferred the criminal 
case against the Hito hua‘ai members 
until 8 February (pir, 13 Jan 2011). 
In response, the police in Rapa Nui 
intensified their harassment of hua‘ai 
members. On 13 January they cut off 
the Hito hua‘ai members from receiv-
ing food and water from outside the 
hotel. This immediately jeopardized 
the health of Tita Hito, a diabetic, 
who was subsequently hospitalized 
with police accompaniment (rnp, 21 
Jan 2011).
State violence continued in Febru-
ary, though court proceedings and 
international action increasingly 
supported the plight of Rapa Nui. 
On 6 February, fifty policemen broke 
through glass doors of the Hangaroa 
Eco Village and Spa and physically 
forced Hito hua‘ai members from the 
hotel. The hua‘ai members were taken 
to the local jail in buses owned by the 
Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa. Armed 
police prohibited any photography of 
the events. Trini Farada, who tried to 
photograph the process, was imme-
diately assaulted by the police forces 
and jailed. A nineteen-year-old male 
was also assaulted for taking pictures, 
but was not jailed. Oscar Vargas, the 
defense attorney for the Hito hua‘ai, 
was “roughed up” by the police force 
and was not initially allowed to con-
sult with the hua‘ai members. Accord-
ing to Vargas, the police removed 
the hua‘ai members without a court 
order and in defiance of the fact that 
a court order had been denied on two 
separate occasions in Valparaíso by 
Judge Maria Cristina Cabello. Rapa 
Nui defense attorney Rodrigo Gomez 
thought that the actions were based 
on a fear that the court was going 
to decide against the Hangaroa Eco 
 Village and Spa and in favor of the 
Hito hua‘ai members on 8 February 
(rnp, 6 Feb 2010).
Internationally, Chile’s violent 
actions against Rapa Nui people have 
been generally criticized. Fe‘iloakitau 
Tevi of the Pacific Conference of 
Churches emphasized solidarity with 
Rapa Nui and asked the Red Cross 
to intervene with medical care (pir, 
8 Dec 2010). The Union of British 
Columbia Indian Chiefs (ubcic) con-
demned Chile’s actions as “ugly, unbe-
lievable and reprehensible” (ubcic, 
4 Dec 2010). Amnesty International 
officially called for investigations into 
excessive force and violations of the 
United Nations ilo Convention 169 
(Flemish Center for Indigenous Peo-
ples blog, 10 Dec 2010). The United 
Nations appointed University of 
Arizona Law Professor James Anaya 
as a special rapporteur to investigate 
the Chilean use of excessive force 
against Rapa Nui (ST, 14 Jan 2011). 
US Senator Daniel Akaka of Hawai‘i 
and Congressman Eni Falemavenga of 
American S?moa wrote letters of sup-
port for Rapa Nui to Chilean Presi-
dent Piñera and US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton (otr, 11 Feb 2011). 
On 16 February, Congressman Fale-
mavenga spoke to the US House of 
Representatives about the conflict in 
Rapa Nui and urged President Barack 
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Obama to discuss the issue during his 
forthcoming visit to Chile. On 7 Feb-
ruary the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights granted the precau-
tionary measures filed by the Indian 
Law Resource Center in October. 
The commission demanded that Chile 
stop the use of armed violence against 
Rapa Nui people and adopt a number 
of measures to ensure their safety and 
integrity (otr, 12 Feb 2011). Attorney 
Crippa of the Indian Law Resource 
Center commented, “The action by 
the iachr validates our concerns that 
human rights are being violated on 
Rapa Nui island. The Chilean govern-
ment must review its policy on Rapa 
Nui issues, take measures to comply 
with international human rights law, 
and begin a fair dialogue with the 
Rapa Nui nation.” The measures were 
filed by Crippa at the request of Rapa 
Nui representatives of twenty-nine of 
the total thirty-six hua‘ai (ST, 8 Feb 
2011).
Legal support for the Hito hua‘ai 
has shifted over time. On 8 Febru-
ary, Chilean Judge Cabello suspended 
the charges against the seventeen 
Hito hua‘ai members, given that the 
Supreme Court has not adjudicated 
regarding who officially owns the 
land (pir, 9 Feb 2011). The Schiess 
family subsequently lost an appeal of 
the decision on 23 February in Val-
paraíso (rnp, 23 Feb 2011). Oddly, 
however, Chilean Minister of the 
Interior Hinzpeter, following dialogue 
with the Schiess family responsible 
for the development of the Hangaroa 
Eco Village and Spa Hotel, proposed 
a thirty-year lease of the land to the 
Schiess family as a “final solution” 
to the conflict. At the culmination of 
the thirty-year period the hotel and 
land would be transferred to a Rapa 
Nui foundation (ST, 20 Feb 2011), 
which would be composed of Rapa 
Nui business associates of the Schiess 
family—among them Petero Edmunds 
Paoa, the former governor at the 
center of the conflict initially (rnp, 21 
Feb 2011). Jeannette Schiess asserted 
that the hotel owners would continue 
to press charges against the seven-
teen Hito hua‘ai members involved 
in reclaiming the lands occupied by 
the hotel (ST, 20 Feb 2011). Minister 
Hinzpeter did not discuss the matter 
with the Hito hua‘ai, and the hua‘ai 
members are explicitly excluded from 
the foundation under the terms of 
the proposal (rnp, 21 Feb 2011). 
Rapa Nui hua‘ai responded with a 
march through the main street on 26 
February. Marisol Hito emphasized 
at the march that given that the Hito 
hua‘ai was not consulted, Minister 
Hinzpeter’s solution disrespected and 
mocked Rapa Nui people (rnp, 26 
Feb 2011).
Though legal actions in February 
seemed to support the Hito hua‘ai, in 
May decisions began to shift in favor 
of the hotel. On 24 May, criminal 
charges were reinstated against the 
Hito hua‘ai by attorney Julian Lopez 
on behalf of the Hangaroa Eco Village 
and Spa Hotel. Measures were also 
filed by attorney Lopez to restrict the 
Hito hua‘ai from approaching the 
hotel, as work to complete the hotel 
was scheduled to proceed. How hua‘ai 
members are to deal with these restric-
tions given that they live across the 
road from the hotel remains unclear. 
Oscar Vargas, the defense attorney 
for the Hito hua‘ai, subsequently filed 
an appeal in the court of Valparaíso 
against the resumption of criminal 
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charges against the hua‘ai members 
and also contested the legality of 
resuming work at the hotel (ECDM, 
July 2011).
On 12 June, a new group was 
elected to the Development Commis-
sion for Easter Island (codeipa). A 
total of 1,196 votes were cast—30 
percent more than in the prior elec-
tion for the commission. Five people 
were elected from among thirty-seven 
candidates. Jose Rapu received the 
most votes with 226, followed by 
Osvaldo Pakarati with 218, Jorge Pont 
with 167, Anakena Manutomatoma 
with 164, and Mario Tuki with 153 
(ECDM, July 2011). As is established by 
the Ley Indigena (Law 19253), those 
elected serve four-year terms. Unlike 
the municipality elections, only Rapa 
Nui people are allowed to vote for 
the commission; Chilean settlers on 
the island are not able to vote. Inter-
estingly, while visiting the island in 
August 2011, I noted four of the five 
people elected were present in many 
of the Rapa Nui Parliament meetings 
and projects. The election results thus 
suggest that radical political economic 
change on the island is supported by 
Rapa Nui people. Of course it is not 
clear that the commission can ever 
generate major changes. The five 
elected Rapa Nui members sit on the 
commission along with four Chilean 
ministers, the Chilean-appointed 
governor of Rapa Nui, the mayor of 
Ha?a Roa (elected by Chilean as well 
as Rapa Nui voters), the non-elected 
president of the Chilean-organized 
Council of Elders, and three other 
members who are typically Chilean 
(the directors of Chile’s Indigenous 
Development Corporation, the Chil-
ean Economic Development Agency, 
and Chile’s National Forest Corpora-
tion). A unified Chilean block of votes 
within the commission easily cancels 
the votes of the five elected Rapa Nui 
members.
As the year in review closed, it did 
not appear Chile had addressed or 
resolved the long-standing conflicts 
Rapa Nui hua‘ai have had regarding 
ancestral lands and self-determina-
tion. In May, Amnesty International 
expressed concern with Chile’s failure 
to constitutionally recognize all of 
its indigenous peoples (pir, 14 May 
2011). On 13 June, over three hun-
dred Rapa Nui again marched through 
main street Ha?a Roa. They marched 
for ancestral lands, in support of the 
Hito hua‘ai, against Chilean treatment 
of Rapa Nui generally, and in protest 
of the closure and possible privatiza-
tion of lands in Vaitea (rnp, June 
2011). In August, Crippa of the Indian 
Law Resource Center and an interna-
tional team working with the Inter-
American Commission on Human 
Rights scheduled public meetings in 
Rapa Nui, Santiago, and Valparaíso 
to discuss international legal measures 
and procedures for establishing true 
self-determination for Rapa Nui and 
the return of all ancestral lands to 
the Rapa Nui people. The Rapa Nui 
decolonization struggle continues.
forrest wade young
Contemporary newspapers and 
other publications on and off the 
island of Rapa Nui increasingly use 
the name “Rapa Nui” to refer to the 
culture, language, and people as well 
as the island. Spelling the name as 
two words is consistent with other 
Polynesian languages, where “nui” 
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is typically represented as a distinct 
word. The shift from using a different 
spelling—“Rapanui”—for the people, 
language, and culture of the island 
also avoids implying a separation 
between these and the island itself. 
The letter “?” (as in Ha?a Roa) is pro-
nounced like the “ng” in the English 
word “singing.”
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Wallis and Futuna
Because no reviews of Wallis and 
Futuna were published in TCP since 
2007, this review covers the 2007–
2011 period.
On 7 May 2007, a chapter of the 
modern history of ‘Uvea Island (also 
called Wallis) closed with the death of 
Lavelua (King) Tomasi Kulimoetoke. 
The lavelua’s passing also affected the 
social and political landscape of the 
whole Territory of Wallis and Futuna 
(Angleviel 2008). Participating in the 
funeral procession were the two kings 
of Futuna, his majesty Tuiagaifo from 
Alo kingdom and his counterpart, 
Tuisigave, from Sigave kingdom. In 
his closing address at the very  moving 
ceremony, Tuiagaifo Soane Patita 
Maituku reminded the crowd of 
the late king’s work and courage in 
 bringing modernity to ‘Uvea as well as 
his efforts to maintain tradition and 
local customs. Tomasi Kulimoetoke 
was native to the southern district of 
Mu‘a on his father’s side and from 
the central district of Hahake on his 
mother’s side. He had been appointed 
king of ‘Uvea in 1959 with the sup-
port of Pelenato Pulufegu Fuluhea, an 
influential personality from Mu‘a who 
was also the former lavelua (1947–
1950). Lavelua Tomasi Kulimoetoke’s 
reign was mostly one of political and 
social stability. After his death, the 
island remained kingless for fourteen 
months.
In January 2008, a new health 
care center, encompassing the exist-
ing Sia Hospital and new extensions, 
was established in Mata Utu, the 
territorial capital, on ‘Uvea. In accor-
dance with the French Ministry of 
Health’s 13 January 2000 mandate, 
the health center became the Health 
Agency of the Territory of the Wal-
lis and Futuna Islands. The agency 
also encompasses another hospital 
(Kalevele) on Futuna and three dispen-
saries, in Mua, Hahake, and Hihifo 
(ieom 2010, 90–92). The agency is 
a national and public establishment 
with  administrative and financial 
autonomy and a primary mission—
to protect people’s health. The year 
2008 also marked the beginning of 
work extending and improving the 
runway at Vele Futuna airport, which 
was undertaken mainly for security 
reasons. In the economic arena, the 
Monitoring  Committee of the Ninth 
European Development Fund (edf) 
met in Mata Utu on 3 April to discuss 
the  development contract between 
the territory and the European Union 
(EU). Among the difficult issues dis-
cussed during the meeting was con-
cern over elementary and high school 
enrollments, which dropped by 5.8 
and 5.1 percent, respectively, in 2010; 
this trend is expected to continue due 
to low birth rates and youth emigra-
tion and may require education system 
restructuring and class closures in 
the future (ieom 2010, 88). Another 
thorny problem was the extension of 
Mata Utu harbor, which was delayed 
not only due to lack of materials but 
primarily because no local company 
was able to handle the job. Finally a 
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French company was hired to under-
take the project.
On 25 July 2008, Kapeliele 
 Faupala, former Kalae Kivalu (prime 
minister) to Lavelua Kulimoetoke, 
was enthroned as king of ‘Uvea. The 
Royalist camp had to go through 
long and hard negotiations before 
 making a choice that not everyone 
agreed with. There had been riots and 
calls to depose Lavelua Kulimoetoke 
after he gave refuge in 2005 to his 
grandson Tomasi Tuugahala, who had 
been sentenced to prison for invol-
untary manslaughter following a car 
accident (Angleviel 2006, 148). The 
Renovator (anti-royalist) side wanted 
every pulekolo (chief) and aliki fa‘u 
(king’s minister) appointed during 
and after that crisis to step down in 
order to allow time for the two sides 
to set up a peace process before look-
ing for a new king, but this was not 
done. Thus, from the outset, neither 
side unanimously accepted the new 
king. On 28 July, Philippe Paolantoni 
was appointed prefect of Wallis and 
Futuna, succeeding Richard Didier. 
But while former Prefect Didier 
seemed to have had cordial relation-
ships with politicians and especially 
with the Lavelua’s Royal Palace in 
Sagato Soane Place, the new superior 
administrator did not. Tensions were 
palpable, and a poisonous atmosphere 
existed between the French adminis-
tration and the royal palace.
Also in July, the Territorial Statis-
tical and Economic Studies Service 
published the first demographic results 
of the 2008 population census, which 
showed a population decrease of 10 
percent from 2003 to 2008—down 
from 14,944 to 13,484 inhabitants 
(Hadj 2009). This alarming fact 
reveals the gloomy social and eco-
nomic climate prevailing in the terri-
tory. The decrease resulted from two 
trends—a reduction in the number 
of children born per woman and the 
departure of youth abroad, mainly 
to France, for training purposes or in 
search of jobs.
In the political arena, the 21 Sep-
tember 2008 legislative elections saw 
religious Brother Lopeleto Laufoa‘ulu 
win a second senate term over Social-
ist Vetelino Nau. Two days later, in an 
effort to strengthen air service passen-
ger capacity, a second DHC Twin Otter 
aircraft named Manulele o Futuna 
(Flying Bird of Futuna) entered service 
alongside the long-serving plane Ville 
de Paris (City of Paris) (ieom 2009, 
83; 2010, 80). In October, the exten-
sion work underway at Vele airport 
on Futuna ran into problems when 
some landowners  threatened to 
block access to the work site. They 
denounced the French administration’s 
proposed financial compensation as 
disrespectful.
After several attempts at peace, the 
gap between Royalists and Renovators 
widened, with each group maintaining 
its own position. On 24 October, the 
Renovators lost one of their political 
leaders, Soane Uhila, who had been 
a founding member of the major-
ity local union, Force Ouvrière, and 
president of the Territorial Assembly, 
1992–1993 and 1999–2000. Dur-
ing a visit to Wallis and Futuna in 
November 2008, French Secretary of 
State for Overseas Territories Yves 
Jego announced the establishment of 
a price-monitoring committee charged 
with annually determining the level 
and structure of prices in Wallis and 
Futuna and reporting to the pre-
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fect (ieom 2009, 1440); the setting 
of a price cap on airfares between 
Noumea and Wallis; and the creation 
of a locally adapted military service 
(Service Militaire Adapté). In late 
2008, two entrepreneurs were indicted 
for organized fraud and false use of 
invoices after an investigation into a 
tax-evasion scam. The investigation 
was conducted under the authority of 
the Court of First Instance of Noumea 
at Mata Utu and the financial supervi-
sion of New Caledonia.
Victor Brial from the Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire (ump, the 
majority party of the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy), who served as dep-
uty of Wallis and Futuna from 2002 to 
2007, was elected president of the Ter-
ritorial Assembly on 4 February 2009. 
He succeeded Pesamino Taputai, who 
was affiliated with the center-right 
party Union for French Democracy–
Democratic Movement (udf-MoDem) 
under François Bayrou. President Brial 
hosted representatives from the Euro-
pean Council who were supervising 
several projects supported under the 
ninth European Development Fund. 
The European Council representa-
tives also helped local politicians in 
the preparation of applications for the 
tenth European Development Fund.
The beginning of 2009 was marked 
by the first social conflict between 
workers and executive staff of the 
Health Agency on 23 February. The 
workers denounced the administra-
tive methods of the director, who had 
been in office since 2007, and called 
for higher wages. In response to the 
workers’ demands, the director left the 
agency on 23 June.
At the end of March 2009, an 
accord was signed between a represen-
tative of the commander of the French 
Armed Forces in the Pacific, based in 
Noumea, and the two kings of Futuna, 
pursuant to talks with Secretary of 
State Jego. This accord laid the foun-
dations of a future Groupements du 
service militaire adapté (gsma) center, 
to be based in Futuna Island. This 
military center will provide training 
to young unskilled people in various 
fields such as building, agriculture, 
security, and grounds maintenance. 
Since the signing, the kings and the 
chiefs of Futuna have been charged 
with finding land on which to estab-
lish the gsma center. This proposal 
had been turned down several times 
by both Lavelua Tomasi Kulimoetoke 
and his successor, Lavelua Kapeliele 
Faupala. On a broader scale, in Wal-
lis on 27 March, New Caledonia 
President Harold Martin, Territorial 
Assembly President Brial, and Pre-
fect Paolantoni held the first meeting 
of the committee that monitors the 
special agreement defining relations 
between Noumea and Wallis and 
Futuna. The talks orbited around 
Wallis and Futuna’s self-development, 
with Caledonian support in various 
fields (education, agriculture, fish-
ing, sport, and so on). On 9 June the 
Wallis and Futuna price-monitoring 
committee was officially implemented 
(ieom 2009, 144).
As dawn arrived on 30 September, 
Wallis and Futuna awoke to find that 
they had avoided the worst effects of 
a strong undersea earthquake that 
occurred near S?moa. A tsunami alert 
had been launched in the region, but 
the alert system did not work in Wallis 
and Futuna or in the Fijian archi-
pelago.
On 2 November 2009, a new 
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branch of the Agence pour le droit à 
l’initiative économique (adie), head-
quartered in France, officially opened 
in Mata Utu (ieom 2009, 145). This 
agency makes small loans available to 
unemployed people through a micro-
credit system, allowing them to imple-
ment projects in various sectors such 
as trade, building, and handicrafts.
On 25 November, the employees of 
the Health Agency began an indefinite 
strike, leading to a blockade of the 
administrative center of Havelu that 
was not cleared until 2 December. 
One week later, on 9 December, in 
the course of the new 2010 budget-
ary session, Victor Brial was reelected 
as head of the Territorial Assembly. 
In light of the economic priority of 
increasing the volume of imports to 
Wallis and Futuna, the politicians 
decided to extend Leava harbor in 
Sigave, Futuna.
On 13 March 2010, Tropical 
Cyclone Tomas devastated the island 
of Futuna, destroying houses, schools, 
shops, and infrastructure along the 
main road as well as in several other 
places. After Wallisian representatives 
led an aerial reconnaissance mission, 
they declared the island a disaster 
area, although fortunately no people 
were killed. On ‘Uvea, it was mostly 
the plantations that suffered. On 23 
March the parent-teacher  association 
of the Mata Utu Public High School, 
the only high school in Wallis and 
Futuna, shut down the school. The 
parents’ representatives decried the 
severely dilapidated building and the 
lack of security due in part to a dys-
functional electrical supply network. 
The high school reopened five weeks 
later, on 12 April.
The social and economic life on 
Wallis Island went from bad to worse. 
On 14 April, the island experienced 
a general cut-off of power and water 
when access to the company in charge 
of the territory’s power and water 
supplies, Electricité et Eau de Wal-
lis et Futuna (eewf), was blocked by 
the company’s main labor union. The 
company has offices in Mata Utu (in 
the central district of Hahake), as well 
as in the southern district of Mu‘a and 
in the northern district, Hihifo. The 
union objected to the dismissal of the 
company’s executive manager and 
questioned the recruitment of a com-
mercial representative. This company 
is a subsidiary of Electricité et Eau de 
Calédonie (eec), which is itself a sub-
sidiary of the world’s second-largest 
power company, gdf (Gaz de France) 
Suez. eewf replaced unelco, becom-
ing the main power company on Wal-
lis Island in 1975 and on Futuna in 
1987. The company became the water 
supplier for Wallis Island in 1986. (On 
Futuna, which has rivers and streams, 
water is directly routed without treat-
ment from source captures to house-
holds.) Ownership of eewf is split 
among eec (67 percent), the Territory 
of Wallis and Futuna (32 percent) and 
others (1 percent). In the first half of 
the twentieth century, the reigning 
kings gave lands to the French admin-
istration so it could establish its main 
offices. In 1975 the administration 
gave a piece of land to eewf so the 
company could build offices. In 1997 
a contract renewing and extending 
the water and power supply arrange-
ment until 2022 was signed by eewf, 
the Territorial Assembly, the lavelua’s 
representative, and the French admin-
istration.
The eewf executive manager was 
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dismissed by the general manager in 
New Caledonia, Yves Morault, based 
on numerous charges of interference 
in company operations. The dismissal 
resulted in a demonstration organized 
by employees protesting Morault’s 
decision. Morault argued that the 
strikers were stealing the company 
and blamed the French State for its 
passivity during this crisis, which 
progressively became an institutional 
matter pitting eewf shareholders (ie, 
eec, the Territorial Assembly, and gdf 
Suez) and the French administration 
against the lavelua and the Grande 
Chefferie (the customary government), 
who have no financial stakes in the 
company.
A delegation of strikers was granted 
an audience with Lavelua Kapeliele 
Faupala and the Royal Council at the 
Palace Office in Sagato Soane Place. 
Meanwhile, negotiations continued 
between the strikers and company 
representatives who had arrived from 
New Caledonia. The king ordered 
the strikers to block access to the 
company offices, arguing that the 
land belonged to the king and that 
he could therefore take it over at any 
moment. Soon, employees’ families 
and relatives came over and joined 
in the demonstration. Another issue 
arose to complicate matters: The Tu‘i 
Mata Utu (the chief of Mata Utu vil-
lage) intervened on the strikers’ behalf, 
arguing that, since one eewf office 
is located in Mata Utu, the company 
had to provide the villagers with jobs, 
such as interior and exterior clean-
ing and maintenance. Also, due to 
multiple power cuts, the population 
suffered losses in terms of damaged 
household appliances. Therefore the 
local Customers Association asked the 
company to reimburse people for these 
losses. On 14 July, the new prefect, 
Michel Jeanjean, succeeded Philippe 
Paolantoni and had to deal with the 
thorny eewf issue. Four days later, 
Lavelua Faupala sent a message to the 
prefecture announcing his decision 
to terminate the contract with eewf 
and demanding that the company 
leave Wallis. Moreover, the chieftain-
ship of Wallis Island formed a new 
water and power company, the Société 
Wallisienne de l’Eau et de l’Electricité, 
with the dismissed executive manager 
as head of the new company. It is 
important to note that the Wallisian 
king made these decisions unilaterally, 
without consulting the Futunan chiefs. 
On 20 July, when the newborn com-
pany began its operations, the whole 
island experienced power and water 
cut-offs. Prefect Jeanjean ordered 
eewf to resume providing the power 
and water supplies. Things returned 
to normal on 23 July. Five days later 
police reinforcements arrived from 
Noumea and took possession of the 
company’s offices from the strikers.
The extension work on Mata Utu 
harbor began on 25 October, super-
vised by Boyer Enterprises. On 30 
November, the digital television service 
tnt (Télévision Numérique Terrestre) 
was officially launched with eight new 
channels instead of the one channel 
that was previously available. At the 
opening of the budget session on 7 
December, Socialist Siliako Lauhea 
was elected president of the Territorial 
Assembly, thanks to a new majority 
looking for a political alternative to 
former President Victor Brial of the 
ump.
Excitement continued to build in 
Wallis and Futuna for the central event 
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of 2011: the commemoration of the 
fiftieth anniversary of their status as a 
French territory. In a broader perspec-
tive, French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
declared 2011 the Year of the French 
Overseas Territories. Wallis and 
Futuna also faces another challenge: 
the organization of the next Pacific 
Minigames in 2013. Sports repre-
sentatives are working on planning 
a program and logistics. In February 
2011, the Internet provider Pacific 
Broadband resumed activity on Wallis, 
being the sole Internet contract holder 
with the Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications. In the cultural 
and religious arena, the Protestant 
Pentecostals published a Wallisian ver-
sion of the Bible, surpassing Catholic 
translation efforts. With regard to the 
peace process between Royalists and 
Renovators, members of the Women’s 
Association of Wallis Island from both 
sides sat down together. After peace 
talks, they met with the lavelua in 
order to show his majesty their deter-
mination to move toward peace.
hapakuke pierre leleivai 
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